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FINTECH LENDING: A STUDY OF EXPECTATIONS  
VERSUS MARKET OUTCOMES 
 




This article explores expectations and outcomes. It docu-
ments the expectations for the fintech lending industry, which has 
emerged in this decade, and compares such expectations to market 
outcomes. It presents an evidence-based analysis for policy making 
decisions. Part one of the article documents expectations—possible 
benefits and risks of fintech lending—through large-scale surveys 
and interviews of industry, consumer and government stakeholders. 
Part two of the article examines market outcomes—benefits and risks 
that have been realized or failed to materialize as documented by 
studies of substantial data sets of various types of fintech loans. The 
benefits and risks explored include increased access to credit, lower 
costs, lack of transparency and delinquency and default. After com-
paring expectations and outcomes, the article considers policy 
implications, particularly the implications for chartering special 
purpose national banks. 
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Introduction 
 Fintech lending, sometimes referred to as online marketplace 
lending, is lending through digital platforms that often collect and base 
lending decisions on nontraditional data sources. Underwriting is 
typically automated and may employ nontraditional credit algorithms.  
 In the consumer and small business credit market, fintech loan 
originations have experienced an annual compounding growth rate of 
163% between 2011 and 2015.1 It is estimated fintech loan origina-
tions (excluding mortgages) could reach $90 billion by 2020, from 
approximately $25 billion in 2015.2 In the U.S. personal loan market, 
fintech lenders’ market share increased from less than 1% in 2010 to 
36% in 2017.3 In the mortgage market, fintech lenders’ market share 
increased from 2% in 2010 to 8% in 2016, with total dollar volume of 
originations growing 30% annually.4 
  This article explores the benefits and risks of fintech lending. 
It documents expectations and compares them to market outcomes. It 
presents an evidence based analysis for later policy making decisions. 
Part I of this article explores expectations regarding fintech lending—
possible benefits and risks—and the reason(s) for such expectations. 
Part II of this article examines market outcomes to date—the benefits 
                                                            
* Professor of Law, St. John’s University. 
1 David W. Perkins, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4464, MARKETPLACE 
LENDING: FINTECH IN CONSUMER AND SMALL BUSINESS LENDING 5 (2016) 
(based on a report by analysts at Deloitte). 
2 AM. BANKERS ASS’N, THE STATE OF DIGITAL LENDING 5 (2018), http:// 
www.aba.com/Products/Endorsed/Documents/ABADigitalLending-
Report.pdf (reporting results of a 2016 report by Autonomous Research, 
stating “loan origination volumes could reach $90 billion by 2020 from about 
$25 billion in 2015”). 
3 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES 
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVA-
TION 13 (2018), https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-08/A-
Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities---Nonbank-
Financials-Fintech-and-Innovation_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JY8-FAQA] 
 [hereinafter Nonbank Financials] (analyzing data from TransUnion). 
4 ANDREAS FUSTER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF, REPORT NO. 
836, THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN MORTGAGE LENDING 1 (2018), https:// 
www newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr836.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9CFU-PK5S] (stating that fintech lending has “grown 
annually by 30% from $34bn of total originations in 2010 (2% of market) to 
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and risks that have been realized or that failed to materialize. After 
comparing expectations and market outcomes, the article explores the 
policy implications of such outcomes. 
 
I. Part One: Expectations  
 Individual opinions of the potential benefits and risks of 
fintech lending are not relied upon in this study. Rather, this article 
documents expectations through large-scale surveys and interviews of 
various stakeholders in the fintech lending market. Three sources 
provide information for this study: (i) a survey conducted by the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury through a Request for Information (RFI) 
in the summer of 2015;5 (ii) interviews conducted by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) from July 2016 to April 2017;6 and (iii) 
solicitation of comments on Special Purpose National Bank [SPNB] 
Charters for Fintech Companies by the U.S. Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (OCC) in December 2016 and January 2017.7 
 The Treasury Department solicited public input through a 
series of fourteen questions on, among other things, business models 
and products offered by fintech lenders, the potential for such lenders 
to expand access to credit to historically underserved market segments, 
and the risks arising from data-driven processes relative to those used 
in traditional lending.8 They received responses from ninety-four 
entities including financial industry members, financial industry 
                                                            
5 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN ONLINE 
MARKETPLACE LENDING (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/ 
documents/opportunities_and_challenges_in_online_marketplace_lending_w
hite_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ7Y-ARUQ] [hereinafter Treasury 
2016] (explaining that the white paper continues the work initiated by 
the issuance of a “Request for Information” and establishes an “over-
view of the evolving market landscape, reviews stakeholder opinions, 
and provides policy recommendations). 
6 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-361, 
FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY: INFORMATION ON SUBSECTORS AND REGULATORY 
OVERSIGHT (2017) [hereinafter GAO-17-361]. 
7 See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T. 
OF THE TREASURY, EXPLORING NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH 
COMPANIES 15–16 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-
innovation/comments/pub-special-purpose-nat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BS5A-3EG9]. 
8 Treasury 2016, supra note 5 at 3, 41 app. B (describing this solicitation of 
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associations, public interest organizations, and state and local govern-
ment entities and regulators.9 The Treasury Department also convened 
industry stakeholders in Washington, D.C. to discuss a range of topics 
including consumer protection, data privacy, capital market issues, and 
regulatory concerns.10 The RFI responses and Treasury Department 
discussions with stakeholders yielded a number of potential benefits 
and risks of fintech lending.  
 
The expected benefits identified were:11 
 
i. lower costs to consumers and small businesses; 
ii. quicker turnaround times; 
iii. greater convenience; and 
iv. expanding access to credit 
 
The survey identified the following potential risks: 
 
i. defaults, based on concern that the accuracy of credit risk in 
use of new data and credit risk models remain untested; 
ii. inaccuracies in new data sources; 
iii. fair lending violations, due to disparate impact of use of new 
data sources and credit models; 
iv. lack of transparency, in bases for underwriting, lending terms, 
and information for investors12; and 
v. predatory lending and targeting of vulnerable borrower 
segments.13 
 
Congress asked GAO to provide it with information on the 
fintech industry, including its structure and development and how 
federal regulators supervise fintech firms.14 GAO obtained input on a 
number of fintech products and services, including fintech lending.15 
Interviews were conducted with staff members of federal government 
regulators, associations of state government financial supervisors, and 
                                                            
9 Id. at 42 app. C (listing the entities that provided responses). 
10 Id. at 19. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 24. 
13 Id. at 20. 
14 GAO-17-361, supra note 6, at 1. 
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numerous industry trade associations.16 Based on these interviews, as 
well as a literature search of publications from agencies, industry 
groups and other knowledgeable parties, GAO identified a number of 
potential benefits and risks of fintech lending, including the 
following:17  
 
i. lower costs; 
ii. expanded access to credit to underserved populations; and 
iii. faster service.18 
 
Potential risks identified were: 
 
i. lack of transparency in loan terms; making comparison of 
lenders difficult; 
ii. fair lending violations that may result from use of nontra-
ditional data for underwriting decisions; and 
iii. delinquency and default possibilities in the marketplace 
lending sector, since little is known as to how the industry’s 
loans will perform in other economic conditions such as a 
recession.19 
 
The OCC’s Request for Comments on possible SPNB Char-
ters for Fintech Companies sought input on all aspects of the fintech 
industry, including input on chartering decisions and requirements.20 
The OCC’s Request for Comments led to 110 responses from fintech 
companies, financial industry associations, state government regula-
tors, public interest groups, public policy centers, and some members 
of Congress.21 This formed the data set for this article. After a review 
of such comments, the expected benefits and risks of fintech lending 
                                                            
16 Id. at 2–3. 
17 Id. at 6–9 (discussing the potential benefits and risks of fintech lending). 
18 Id. at 6–7. 
19 The report also identified as a risk the lack of the same legal protections for 
small business borrowers as are extended to consumers, but the risk is not 
unique to fintech lending. Id. at 8–9.  
20 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 7 at 15–16. 
21 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, PUBLIC COMMENTS ON EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL 
BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES, http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics 
/responsible-innovation/fintech-charter-comments.html (last updated Jan. 27, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/U92K-BUYF] [hereinafter OCC Public Comments] 
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were isolated—as opposed to other fintech products and services, or 
the benefits and risks of federal versus state regulation of the industry. 
The potential benefits of fintech lending stated by the com-
mentators, by decreasing order of frequency, were: 
 
i. expanded access to credit;  
ii. faster, more convenient processes and access to credit; 
iii. lower costs to borrowers; 
iv. less systemic risk; 
v. less privacy and data security risk; 
vi. less bias in lending decisions; and 
vii. better loan portfolio performance.22  
 
The potential risks of fintech lending stated by the commen-
tators, by decreasing order of frequency, were:  
 
i. predatory lending and targeting of vulnerable borrowers; 
ii. fair lending violations; 
iii. lack of transparency; 
iv. threats to customer privacy; 
v. delinquency and default risks for both borrowers and lenders; 
vi. challenges to the ability of government to effectively regulate; 
and 
vii. exclusion of unbanked or low-income consumers.23 
 
There was only modest overlap in the parties providing input 
in the three surveys. Nonetheless, the benefits and risks identified in 
the three surveys were fairly consistent. What were the precise mean-
ings and reasons associated with each expectation? This article 
explores such issues, and will assist in analysis of the ability of current 
legal initiatives to promote benefits and minimize risks of fintech 
lending. In the OCC Public Comments the benefit most frequently 
expected from fintech lending was expanded access to credit.24 This 
                                                            
22 See generally id. 
23 Id. 
24 Some comments expressed this expected benefit without clearly identifying 
the specific reason for the expectation. Letter from Daniel Gorfine, Vice 
President, External Affairs & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, On Deck Capital, Inc., to 
Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 15, 2017); Letter from 
Kevin Foster-Keddie, President & CEO, Wash. State Employees Credit 
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was based on: (i) lack of geographic barriers to access;25 (ii) better 
identification of creditworthy customers through data driven processes 
that consider additional sources of credit information;26 (iii) new 
                                                                                                                              
the Currency (Jan. 13, 2017) (considering how expansion of fintech products 
and services will create more access for consumers); Letter from Stephen 
Denis, Small Bus. Fin. Ass’n, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the 
Currency (Jan. 12, 2017) (discussing how emerging technology and the 
development of new platforms are allowing alternative lenders to reach 
underserved businesses and those that traditional finance will not or cannot 
serve); Letter from Robert S. Lavet, Gen. Counsel, Social Fin., Inc. (Jan. 12, 
2017) (highlighting how fintech is serving groups with few ties to traditional 
banks and homeowners not well served by traditional mortgage lenders); 
Letter from Safa Mahzari, entrepreneur, to Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (Dec. 27, 2016). 
25 Letter from Albert Goldstein, CEO, Avant, Inc., to Thomas J. Curry, 
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 15, 2017) (raising fintech’s ability to offer 
consumers ability to access more credit opportunities than those available in 
the neighborhoods); Letter from Dafina Williams, Opportunity Fin. Network, 
to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 15, 2017) (discussing 
the presence of bank deserts, especially in low income communities and 
communities of color, with marketplace lenders filling the gap); Letter from 
Peter Renton, Co-founder & Chairman, LendIt Conference LLC, Founder & 
CEO, Lend Academy LCC, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency 
(Jan. 13, 2017) (considering fintech’s contribution to the elimination of 
geographic barriers).  
26 Letter from Scott Talbott, Senior VP of Gov’t Affairs, Elec. Transactions 
Ass’n, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017) 
(“Fintech platforms have also been used by Community Development 
Financial Institutions (‘CDFIs’) and other non-profit community lenders and 
development organizations to help increase efficiency in the lending process 
and better identify creditworthy small businesses.”); Letter from Richard 
Eckman, Attorney, Pepper Hamilton on behalf of LEND360, to Thomas J. 
Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 15, 2017); Letter from Joan Aristei, 
Vice President, Regulatory Legal & Compliance, Oportun Inc., to Thomas J. 
Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan 13, 2017) (“Oportun also helps these 
‘credit invisible’ customers establish a credit history by reporting their 
payments to two of the three nationwide credit reporting agencies.“); Letter 
from Scott Askins, Gen. Counsel, Kabbage, Inc., to Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (Jan. 13, 2017) (“FinTechs are well-positioned to diversify 
their business by expanding into other non-deposit business lines, such as 
technology licensing and paid advanced data insights for customers.”); Letter 
from Lisa S. McGreevy, President & CEO, Online Lenders Alliance, to 
Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 13, 2017); Letter from 
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product offerings, including lower loan size;27 (iv) lower search, 
transaction and underwriting costs for both borrower and lender;28 (v) 
diminished opportunity for human bias in underwriting;29 and (vi) the 
ability to reach the unbanked through electronic access.30 Faster, more 
convenient access to credit was the second most frequently expected 
                                                                                                                              
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 13, 2016) (“The OCC can ensure that 
perceived concentration risks are mitigated by ensuring appropriate capital 
and liquidity requirements and asset ratios are maintained–in proportion to a 
fintech firm’s size, credit quality, and business model type –to offset the 
particular risks of each authorized activity.”).  
27 Conor French, Gen. Counsel, Funding Circle, to Thomas J. Curry, 
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017); Letter from Nathaniel Hoopes, 
Exec. Dir., Marketplace Lending Ass’n, to Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (Jan. 17, 2017); Letter from Lisa S. McGreevy, supra note 26; 
Letter from Richard H. Neiman, Head of Regulatory & Gov’t Affairs, 
Lending Club, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 
2017) (explaining small businesses seeking smaller loans difficult to access 
from traditional banks); Letter from Responsible Bus. Lending Coal., to 
Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017) (proposing to 
focus on lending generally below $150,000, an underserved segment of the 
market).  
28 Letter from Frank Altman, President & Chief Exec. Officer, and Nick 
Elders, Vice President, Cmty. Reinvestment Fund USA, to Thomas J. Curry, 
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017) (explaining that in the post-Great 
Recession regulatory framework, small loans under $250,000 cost the same to 
originate as those over $250,000); Letter from Nathaniel Hoopes, supra note 
27; Letter from Richard H. Neiman, supra note 27 (explaining the steps the 
Lending Club uses to lower banking costs, allowing the savings to be passed 
onto customers in the form of lower rates and better returns); Letter from 
Jennifer Tescher, President & CEO, Jeanne Hogarth, Vice President, Ctr. for 
Fin. Servs. Innovation, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 
17, 2017) (describing technology costs that have lowered costs).  
29 Letter from Conor French, supra note 27 (explaining how the proposal 
would increase consistency across customers and provide equitable access to 
uniform credit opportunities); Letter from Nathaniel Hoopes, supra note 27; 
Letter from Brian Peters, Exec. Dir., Fin. Innovation NOW, to Thomas J. 
Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2016) (“The CRA model would 
not be appropriate for most Fintechs due to the lack of branches and the 
declining relevance of geography and diminished opportunity for human bias 
made more possible by delivery of financial services via the mobile 
internet.”).  
30 Letter from Manuel P. Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Affirm Inc., to Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2016) (explaining Affirm’s belief that 
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benefit of fintech lending.31 This encompassed less time needed to 
apply,32 faster loan approvals,33 user friendly access,34 24/7 access,35 
and real time information and advice that aids decision-making by 
borrowers.36 Lower costs of borrowing was a third benefit expected, 
although the number of commentators expressing this expectation was 
far fewer than the first two benefits previously discussed.37 Through 
the use of technology that lowers costs to facilitate loans, commen-
tators expected more affordable loans and lower interest rates.38  
 The other expected benefits were each voiced by one or two 
commentators in each instance. Commenters expected less systemic 
risk due to the diversification of types and geographic location of, 
                                                            
31 Letter from Conor French, supra note 27 (listing “[e]quitable access to 
credit opportunities as a result of uniformity” as one of the public policy 
benefits of a nationwide regulatory framework for fintech companies). 
32 Id. at 3. (critiquing the “almost 25 hours” needed to complete paperwork for 
small business loans). 
33 Letter from Scott Askins, supra note 26, at 1 (enabling small businesses 
receive credit decision in fewer than seven minutes and can quickly access 
funds); Letter from Nathaniel L. Hoopes, supra note 27 (explaining how the 
new technology provides faster loan approvals, which is important because 
few can afford to wait weeks or months for a loan decision); Letter from Scott 
Talbot, supra note 26.  
34 Letter from Richard H. Neiman, supra note 27 (discussing how to allow 
borrowers to access loans through a fast and easy interface); Letter from 
Richard C. Litman to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency 1 (Jan. 
15, 2017) (explaining that fintech provides services that are more accessible 
and user friendly for small businesses and consumers); Letter from John A. 
Costa, Managing Dir., Auriemma Consulting Grp., to Thomas J. Curry 5 (Jan. 
13, 2017); ; Letter from Masayuki Hosaka, President, Rakuten Card Co., Ltd., 
Vice Chairman & Fintech Segment Leader, Rakuten, Inc., to Beth 
Knickerbocker, Acting Chief Innovation Officer, Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency 2 (Jan. 12, 2015) (discussing benefits of fintech, including faster 
transaction times, and improved customer access and experience); see also 
Letter from Peter Renton, supra note 25 (Jan. 13, 2017) (explaining how most 
fintechs have high NPS scores, which gauges customers’ overall satisfaction). 
35 Letter from Scott Askins, supra note 26, at 2 (“Automated, data-driven 
lending technology and flexible funding distribution options with 24/7 online 
access fill a notable gap in the lending marketplace and provide a critical 
service, particularly for time-strapped business owners.”). 
36 Letter from Jennifer Tescher & Jeanne M. Hogarth, supra note 28, at 6. 
37 See OCC Public Comments, supra note 21. 
38 Letter from Richard H. Neiman, supra note 27 (explaining how Lending 
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diversification of loan terms, and eliminating borrower or depositor 
assets from being at risk.39 Commenters also expected less privacy and 
data security risk because fintech firms are often the first to integrate 
higher security measures.40 The use of automated, objective lending 
techniques created an expectation of minimalizing bias in lending deci-
sions.41 Finally, commenters expected improved loan portfolio perfor-
mance because fintech lenders collect, generate, and maintain exten-
sive performance data on borrowers and the industry, and persistent 
corrections provide insight to borrowers’ ongoing risk profile.42  
 The most commonly expected risk of fintech lending com-
mentators voiced was predatory lending. The type of conduct identi-
fied as possible risks were: (i) very high interest rates based, in part, on 
risk adjusted rates and borrower willingness to pay more due to 
concerns about barriers to access to credit;43 (ii) encouraging constant 
renewal of loans and double charging fees when loans are renewed;44 
(iii) unaffordable repayment terms, such as repayment from gross 
                                                            
39 Id.; Letter from Scott Askins, supra note 26. 
40 Letter from Brian Peters, supra note 29 (discussing how fintech companies 
are usually among the first to integrate higher securities measures, such as 
tokenization of payment data and two-factor authentication).  
41 Letter from Scott Askins, supra note 26; Letter from Nathaniel L. Hoopes, 
supra note 33 (highlighting more consistent outcomes from automated 
decisions). 
42 Letter from Scott Askins, supra note 26.  
43 Letter from Adam Rust, Dir. of Research, Reinvestment Partners, and 
Marceline White, Exec. Dir., Md. Consumer Rights Coal., to Thomas Curry, 
Comptroller (Jan. 14, 2017) (discussing risk adjusted rates); Letter from 
Kevin Stein, Cal. Reinvestment Coal., to Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the 
Currency (Jan. 14, 2017) (discussing concerns about barriers to accessing 
credit). Many comments expressed concern over the risk of high interest rates 
and predatory lending practices. See, e.g., Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law 
Ctr., Consumers Union, Main St. All., and U.S. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 
to Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017); Letter from 
Responsible Bus. Lending Coal., supra note 27 (explaining how APRs are 
commonly above 50% and can reach 300%); Letter from Eric Weaver, Chief 
Exec. Officer, Opportunity Fund, to Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the 
Currency (Jan. 13, 2017) (highlighting average APRs of 94%). 
44 Letter from Responsible Bus. Lending Coal., supra note 27; Letter from 
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revenue;45 and (iv) hidden or deceptive prepayment charges, or an 
inability to prepay at all or without penalty.46 
 A second expected risk of fintech lending was a unique risk of 
fair lending violations. Commenters feared the disparate impact of data 
driven decisions, specifically due to the use of data to make inferences 
based on group profiles,47 the use of algorithms that may have discri-
minatory factors embedded in their formulas,48 the use of data contain-
ing errors,49and the potential redlining of borrowers with limited social 
networks50 or neighborhoods through the ability of investors to con-
figure borrower profiles.51  
A third expected risk of fintech lending was a lack of trans-
parency. This encompassed risks for borrowers, such as (i) opaque and 
unclear loan terms and conditions, including failure to disclose rates on 
small business loans and obfuscation of high financing costs;52 and (ii) 
                                                            
45 Letter from Responsible Bus. Lending Coal., supra note 27; Letter from 
Adam Rust & Marceline White, supra note 43; Letter from Kevin Stein, 
supra note 43. 
46 Letter from Responsible Bus. Lending Coal., supra note 27; Letter From 
Michelle Sternthal, Deputy Dir. of Policy & Gov’t Affairs, Main St. All., to 
Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 16, 2017). 
47 Letter from Jeff Chester & Katharina Kopp, Ctr. for Dig. Democracy, 
Edmund Mierzwinski, U.S. Pub. Interest Research Grp., to Thomas Curry, 
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 15, 2017). 
48 Letter from A-1 Cmty. Hous. Serv., et al., to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller 
of the Currency (Jan. 14, 2017). See also Letter from Gregory W. Meeks, 
Cedric L. Richmond, Gwen Moore, Terri A. Sewell, Donald M. Payne, & 
Tony Cardenas, Members of Cong., to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the 
Currency (Jan. 13, 2017) (referencing a 2016 White House report that 
“provided a number of examples of the unintended consequences of 
technological innovation for underserved communities, including ‘the 
potential to perpetuate, exacerbate, or mask discrimination’”).  
49 Letter from Chester, & Kopp, & Mierzwinski, supra note 47 (reminding the 
OCC of its duty to prevent nonbank lenders and affiliated depository 
institutions from engaging in discriminatory lending practices by using 
“alternative data” that often contains errors that lead to unfair treatment of 
consumers). 
50 Letter from Gregory W. Meeks, et. al., supra note 48.  
51 Letter from Frank Altman & Nick Elders, supra note 28 (highlighting how 
fintech investors can configure investor profiles in order to target specific 
groups in the market, including “the ability to define neighborhoods she 
wishes to lend to” which is against federal law prohibiting “redlining”).  
52 See Letter from Richard Neiman, supra note 27; Letter from the 
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use of underwriting methods and pricing metrics that borrowers would 
not understand.53 This also extended to risks for investors, and —
especially unsophisticated investors in peer-to-peer lending, due to 
issues surrounding transparency and complexity issues.54 
These first three risks were voiced by the largest number of 
commentators.55 Several commentators voiced two additional risks.56 
One risk was an expected threat to customer privacy.57 This is because 
fintech lenders collect and use a broad spectrum of personal informa-
tion to make financial decisions, and may be subject to cybersecurity 
risks.58 A second risk several commentators voiced was possible 
                                                                                                                              
Main St. All., to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency 1 (Jan. 16, 
2017) (expressing concern that the proposed fintech charter would placer 
small businesses “at grave financial risk”); Letter from Eric Weaver, supra 
note 43. See also Letter from John Taylor, President & CEO, Nat’l Cmty. 
Reinvestment Coal., to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 13, 
2017) (voicing an urgent need for the OCC to enforce rigorous standards of 
safety and soundness when assigning fintech charters given recent concerns of 
“the possibility of payday lenders and other unscrupulous actors applying for 
fintech charters.”).  
53 Letter from Richard Neiman, supra note 27. See also Letter from Adam 
Rust & Marceline White, supra note 43 (“As the Treasury Department’s 
research on online marketplace lending notes the underlying operations and 
underwriting models remain fairly untested.”).  
54 Letter from Brian Simmonds Marshall, Policy Counsel, Ams. for Fin. 
Reform, to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency 7 (Jan. 15, 2017) 
(“[P]eer-to-peer online lending platforms . . . are by definition funded entirely 
by frequently unsophisticated retail investors.”). 
55 OCC PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 21 (listing public comments solicited 
on the exploration SPNB bank charters for fintechs). 
56 Id. (listing public comments to OCC exploration). 
57 Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 43 at 49–50 (dedicating 
significant discussion to consumer privacy concerns); Letter from Richard H. 
Neiman, supra note 27; Letter from Andrew Morris, Regulatory Affairs 
Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Federally-Insured Credit Unions, to Thomas J. Curry, 
Comptroller of the Currency 3 (Jan. 14, 2017); Letter from Chester, Kopp, & 
Mierzwinski, supra note 47. 
58 Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 43 at 49–50 (highlighting 
the importance of personal information with regard to fintechs); Letter from 
Richard H. Neiman, supra note 27 at 18–19 (“The charterholder should have 
in place robust security controls to safeguard the personal information of 
borrowers and investors and to prevent unauthorized access of information.”); 
Andrew Morris, supra note 56; Letter from Chester, Kopp, & Mierzwinski, 
supra note 47, at 2 (“The use of personal data by Fintech companies is 
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delinquency and default risk.59 One aspect of this risk focuses on the 
lenders, which are new firms with “evolving business models that have 
not been fully tested.”60 Another aspect of default risk focuses on the 
borrower.61 Fintechs use new lending models based on recently-
developed algorithms that have not yet been adequately tested.62 Their 
portfolios have yet to experience periods of recession and economic 
distress “that could impact repayment, delinquency, and losses.”63 
Finally, at least one commentator identified two additional 
risks.64 First was the ability of government to understand and effec-
tively regulate the business models and algorithms of fintech lenders, 
as well as its ability to respond to market changes.65 The second risk 
                                                                                                                              
marketing, customer loyalty management, pricing, fraud prevention, and 
underwriting.”). 
59 Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 43 at 30 (discussing a 
responsible lending program as one that adequately deals with risk of default); 
Letter from Dafina Williams, supra note 25, at 6 (pointing out that fintechs do 
not have experience handing delinquencies or similar situations); Letter from 
John Taylor, supra note 52, at 2 (supporting a uniform regulatory regime 
including fintechs to reduce risks). 
60 Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 43 at 11 (pointing out the 
novelty of fintechs and the consequences if they were to become national too 
quickly). See also Letter from Dafina Williams, supra note 25 (“Once the 
marketplace lending portfolios . . . experience a recession, it will be clear [if] 
new streams of data . . . and predictive analytics added value to the overall 
lending risk and default equation,” citing Letter from Frank Altman, President 
& Chief Exec. Officer, Nick Elders, Vice President, Cmty. Reinvestment 
Fund USA, to Laura Temel, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (Sept. 30, 2015)). 
61 Letter from John Taylor, supra note 52, at 4 (observing predatory fintech 
loans and providing suggestions to reduce risks related to minority and low 
income borrowers). 
62 Dafina Williams, supra note 25, at 4 (“Many of the technology platforms 
and algorithm-based lending models used by fintech companies to underwrite 
loans and assess risk are new and untested business models.”). 
63 Id. at 4 (describing the lack of adverse market conditions since many 
fintechs began operating); Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 
43 at 11; Letter from John Taylor, supra note 52, at 2 (listing recession as a 
key risk to lenders). 
64 Letter from Adam Rust & Marceline White, supra note 43 at 1 (advising 
against allowing fintechs to get an SPNB charter); Letter from Dafina 
Williams, supra note 25, at 5 (discussing the speed that fintechs adjust to 
changing external environments). 
65 Letter from Dafina Williams, supra note 25, at 5 (“Advancements in 
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was that of further exclusion of unbanked and low-income consumers 
was raised.66 This fear results from a business model that relies on 
automated clearing houses for repayments and that encounters literacy, 
numeracy, and technology challenges many low-income consumers 
experience.67  
The benefits and risks noted in these surveys were those that 
knowledgeable industry, government, and consumer stakeholders 
believed were likely outcomes as the fintech lending industry 
emerged.68 Section II of this article examines whether these outcomes 
were realized. 
 
II. Part Two: Market Outcomes 
 Have the expected benefits of fintech lending been realized? 
Have the expected risks of fintech lending surfaced? Anecdotal 
evidence is not presented. The article relies not on anecdotal evidence, 
but on outcomes measured by studies of substantial data sets of various 
types of loans. 
 
A. Expanded Access Benefit 
 
 The most frequently mentioned expected benefit of fintech 
lending in the OCC Public Comments was expanded access to credit.69 
Many studies have addressed this expectation,70 and have explored 
various factors that might lead fintech firms to produce this benefit.71 
They have examined the sizes of loans available, the sizes and ages of 
                                                                                                                              
underwriting algorithms can be adjusted quickly, but the ability of 
government to respond to these changes is far more limited.”). 
66 Letter from Adam Rust & Marceline White, supra note 43 at 3. 
67 Id. (“[M]any [lenders] are not equipped to address the literacy, numeracy, 
and technological challenges that many low-income consumers experience.”).  
68 OCC Public Comments, supra note 21 (listing possible costs and benefits of 
a special-purpose fintech charter). 
69 See id. (stating expanded access to credit most frequently as one of the 
benefits of a special-purpose fintech charter). 
70 Claessens et al., Fintech Credit Markets Around the World: Size, Drivers 
and Policy Issues, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 29, 39 (Sept. 2018) 
(citing several studies as “evidence that fintech platforms have widened 
access to credit.”). 
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businesses applying for credit, the geographic distribution of lenders 
and borrowers, and the creditworthiness of borrowers.72 
 As will be explored below, overall, market outcomes indicate 
fintech lenders have increased access to credit, although the evidence 
is divided on whether fintech firms make credit available to borrowers 
who are less creditworthy under traditional underwriting standards. 
Studies documenting market outcomes are in agreement that 
fintech lending increases access to credit for borrowers seeking smaller 
loans.73 Tang examined access to credit in the consumer loan market 
using LendingClub loans as the data set.74 This data set consisted of 
loan applications and originations by LendingClub in the period 
between 2009 to 2012, as well as data from annual Call Reports from 
banking institutions. When examining loan size, Tang concluded peer-
to-peer platforms operate “as complements to banks by offering 
smaller loans.”75 Jagtiani and Lemieux's 2016 study of fintech len-
ders76 confirms that fintech lenders make available smaller loans. The 
table of underwriting terms of fintech lenders they collected docu-
ments how many lenders make loans available in amounts as low as 
$2,000 or $3,000.77 
Increased access to credit was also an expectation that was 
intended to address the difficulties faced by smaller businesses, 
younger firms, and minority-owned firms in accessing credit through 
traditional credit channels. Wiersch, Kipman, and Barkley analyzed 
the results of the Federal Reserve Banks’ 2015 Small Business Credit 
                                                            
72 Id. (identifying possible beneficiaries of fintech lending including smaller 
business and less affluent individuals whose access to bank credit is limited). 
73 See generally Huan Tang, Peer-to-Peer Lenders versus Banks: Substitutes 
or Complements?, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 1900 (2019). 
74 Id. at 1902. 
75 Id. 
76 See generally Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Small Business 
Lending after the Financial Crisis: A New Competitive Landscape for 
Community Banks, Economic Perspectives, 2016, https://www.chicagofed. 
org/publications/economic-perspectives/2016/3-jagtiani-lemieux (discussing 
the increased competition in the market for small business loans, which has 
traditionally been dominated by community banks, because of new 
technology such as fintech, but also because big banks have entered the 
market). 
77 Id. at 21 (stating that the range of loan amounts offered by LendingClub 
and Prosper Marketplace).(E.S. changed the pincite to the actual page that the 
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Survey.78 That survey received responses from 3,459 employer firms.79 
Barkley et al. reported first on applications for loans, and found that 
online lender applicants are smaller firms (83% have annual revenues 
of $1 million or less), younger firms (those in existence for five or 
fewer years), and are more likely to be minority-owned firms (36% of 
the online applicant pool compared to 14% of traditional-source 
applicants).80  
 They then reported on loan approvals. They found that of 
applicants that applied to online lenders, large banks and small banks 
were more likely to be approved by online lenders for at least some of 
the financing sought.81 Among online lender applicants, 71% were 
approved for at least some financing at online lenders, compared to 
28% at small banks and 17% at large banks.82 
 The 2016 Small Business Credit Survey received responses 
from 10,303 employer firms,83 and confirmed that smaller firms are 
more likely to apply for loans at online lenders.84 It also found small 
firms were more likely to be approved at online lenders compared to 
                                                            
78 ANN MARIE WIERSCH ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, CLICK, 
SUBMIT: NEW INSIGHTS ON ONLINE LENDER APPLICANTS FROM THE SMALL 
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY (2016), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-
and-events/publications/special-reports/sr-20161012-click-submit.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/9HWM-YY4J]. 
79 Id. at 2 (“The participating Reserve Banks released in March 2016 the 
findings for the sample’s 3,459 employer firms.”). 
80 Id. at 4 (“Online lender applicants are smaller, younger, and more likely to 
be minority-owned.”). 
81 Id. at 8 (“Firms that applied to online lenders had lower success rates, 
although 77 percent of these applicants received at least some credit.”). 
82 Id. at 8 (providing graphs showing the success rate of applicants who 
applied for funding from online lenders). 
83 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ET AL., 2016 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT 
SURVEY: REPORT ON EMPLOYER FIRMS (2017), https://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
medialibrary/media/smallbusiness/2016/SBCS-Report-EmployerFirms-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN4F-CVTP] [hereinafter 2016 SMALL BUSINESS 
CREDIT SURVEY] (“The 2016 SBCS, which was fielded in Q3 and Q4 2016, 
yielded 10,303 responses from employer firms in 50 states and the District of 
Columbia.”). 
84 Id. (showing that twenty-one percent of small business credit applicants 
applied to online lenders, but this share was 26% of smaller applicants (with 
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large banks and credit unions.85 However, such firms were equally 
likely to be approved at small banks.86 
 Studies documenting market outcomes have also concluded 
that fintech lenders remove geographic barriers and constraints to 
credit availability.87 Jagtiani & Lemieux examined LendingClub’s 
consumer loans that originated from 2010 to 2016 and compared them 
to credit card loans that carry balances reported to the Federal Reserve 
in the 2014–2016 period by banks with at least $50 billion in assets.88 
They examined the geographic distribution of loans89 and concluded: 
 
LendingClub’s consumer lending activities have 
penetrated areas that could benefit from additional 
credit supply, especially highly concentrated banking 
markets and other areas that have fewer bank 
branches per capita. Finally . . . LendingClub had a 
higher market share in areas where economic varia-
bles indicated a more challenging environment . . . 
evidence that fintech lenders can fill credit gaps in 
areas where bank offices may be less available and 
the local economy may be more challenging.90 
 
Studies documenting market outcomes are divided, however, 
on whether fintech lenders increase access to credit to borrowers with 
                                                            
85 Id. at 16. (showing that approval rates for firms with $1 million or less of 
revenue were 59% at online lenders, 45% at large banks and 43% at credit 
unions). 
86 Id. (reporting an approval rate at small banks for such firms of sixty percent 
and an approval rate at community development financial institutions of 
seventy-seven percent). 
87 See, e.g., Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Do Fintech Lenders 
Penetrate Areas That Are Underserved by Traditional Banks? 5–6 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Phila. Working Paper No. 18-13, 2018), https://doi.org/ 
10.21799/frbp.wp.2018.13 (“This analysis points to the possibility that fintech 
lenders can provide credit in areas that may be underserved by traditional 
banks.”). 
88 Id. at 5–6 (setting out the methodology and analytical framework of the 
study).  
89 Id. at 9 (concluding that consumer lending was concentrated in the 
Northeast and West Coast). 
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credit challenges under traditional creditworthiness criteria.91 Jagtiani 
& Lemieux examined loan-level data on loans originated by 
LendingClub in its consumer platform, in the period 2007–2017, as the 
data set to correlate lending to credit scores.92 They found “the use of 
nontraditional information from alternative data sources has allowed 
consumers with fewer or inaccurate credit records (based on FICO 
scores) to have access to credit. Some creditworthy consumers (but 
who have poor FICO scores) have been identified using additional 
information and have been rated as low-risk borrowers by 
LendingClub.”93 
 The 2017 Small Business Credit Survey received responses 
from 8,169 employer firms.94 It explored credit applicants’ approval 
rates by comparing low credit risk applicants and medium/high credit 
risk applicants.95 The approval rate among medium/high credit risk 
applicants was 71% at non-bank alternative and marketplace lenders, 
35% at large banks, 47% at small banks and 26% at credit unions.96 
                                                            
91 Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, The Roles of Alternative Data and 
Machine Learning in Fintech Lending: Evidence from the Lending Club 
Consumer Platform 6–7 (Working Paper No. 18-15, 2018) https://doi.org/ 
10.21799/frbp.wp.2018.15 [https://perma.cc/N259-6E8T] (examining, in 
addition, loan level data in Y-14M reports submitted by banks, deposit market 
concentration data and bank information based on the FDIC summary of 
deposits database, and economic factors from the U.S. Census Bureau and the 
Haver Analytics database). 
92 Id. at 6–7 (comparing account-level credit card data with consumer loans 
made for credit card payoff). 
93 Id. at 18. This study is a refinement of the earlier one conducted by Jagtiani 
and Lemieux in which they compared average FICO scores and concluded 
“Lending Club borrowers do not have very low FICO scores. Their average 
FICO score is only very slightly below the average of overall Equifax consu-
mers . . . .” Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial 
Inclusion, Risk Pricing, and Alternative Information 16 (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Phila., Working Paper No. 17-17, 2017), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/ 
analytical/cfr/bank-research-conference/annual-17th/papers/14-jagtiani.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JP8X-SK4C]. 
94 See generally FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ET AL., 2017 SMALL 
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY: REPORT ON EMPLOYER FIRMS (2017), https:// 
www fedsmallbusiness.org/medialibrary/fedsmallbusiness/files/2018/sbcs-
employer-firms-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/G55X-84QY] [hereinafter 2017 
SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY]. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 26. Low credit risk was defined as 80–100 business credit score or 






2018-2019 FINTECH LENDING 743 
 
 However, not all studies found that fintech lending increased 
access to credit for borrowers with creditworthiness challenges.97 
TransUnion’s study of the personal loan market between 2014 and 
2016 concluded that fintech borrowers do not turn to fintech lenders as 
their only source of funding.98 Instead, “FinTech consumers typically 
have other loans, and have a similar distribution and penetration to 
bank and credit union consumers. FinTech consumers elect to incor-
porate FinTech loans into their broader personal finance portfolio.”99 
This does not mean that fintech lenders do not increase access to credit 
at all, but rather suggests that the majority of fintech borrowers qualify 
for loans through traditional credit channels.  
Tang also examined access to credit in the consumer loan 
market using LendingClub loans in the 2009–2012 period as the data 
set.100 When examining borrower quality based on FICO scores, the 
study concluded that “P2P [peer-to-peer] loans are substitutes to bank 
loans,”101 that is, they serve the same customers. Tang found the same 
results when borrower quality was measured by combining FICO 
score, debt-to-income ratio, and length of employment.102 Tang con-
cluded that “[o]verall, these findings indicate that P2P platforms are 
substitutes for banks in that they serve the same borrower popula-
tion.”103 
Finally, Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski & Serie examined mort-
gage loans originated in the 2007–2015 period.104 They examined 
                                                                                                                              
credit score or a 630–719 personal credit score. High credit risk was defined 
as a 1-49 business credit score or a personal credit score equal to or less than 
620. Id. 
97 See, e.g., John Wirth, Fact or Fiction: Are FinTechs Different than Other 
Lenders?, TRANSUNION (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.transunion.com/blog/ 
fact-or-fiction-are-fintechs-different-than-other-lenders 
[https://perma.cc/HUK2-5E7D] (showcasing a study that did not find that 
fintech lending increased access to credit for borrowers with creditworthiness 
challenges). 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 See generally Tang, supra note 73. 
101 Id. at 3. 
102 Id. at 4–5. 
103 Id. at 5. 
104 See generally Greg Buchak et al., Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the 
Rise of Shadow Banks (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
23288, Sept. 2018), http://www nber.org/papers/W23288 [https://perma.cc/ 
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traditional banks’ loans, non-fintech shadow banks’ loans, and fintech 
loans.105 They concluded “[f]intech lenders serve different segments of 
the mortgage market than non-fintech shadow banks . . . .”106 Further, 
“fintech lenders are less likely to serve less creditworthy FHA borrow-
ers and higher unemployment geographies.”107 Additionally, “fintech 
lenders’ origination activity overwhelmingly focuses on refinan-
cing[.]”108 One possible reason is that the more standardized tasks 
involved in mortgage refinancing are the best fit for fintech tech-
nology.109 
Studies also dispute the expectation that fintech lending can 
increase access to credit among the unbanked.110 The OCC Public 
Comments identified use of technology by fintech lenders as the basis 
for increased access to credit by unbanked or underbanked indivi-
duals.111 A study by McHenry, Goldberg, Lewis, Carlson, & Mehta 
provides evidence of challenges in achieving this expected benefit.112 
                                                                                                                              
collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Fannie Mae Single-
Family Loan Performance data in the 2000–16 period, Freddie Mac loan-level 
data for the 2005–15 period, FHA insured single-family loan data in the 
2010–16 period, and U.S. Census data. 
105 See id. at 2–3 (studying how “regulatory differences and technological 
advantages” contributed to changes in the mortgage loans market). 
106 Id. at 4. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 17 (speculating that fintech technology is better suited for mortgage 
refinancing because it involves a more standardized procedure than new 
purchases). 
110 See, e.g., Giulia McHenry et al., Digital and Financial Inclusion: How 
Internet Adoption Impacts Banking Status 4 (Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. 
Admin., Working Paper, 2017) (“Fintech promises to bring economic inclu-
sion and lower financial costs to un(der)banked populations. Our research 
suggests, however, that these populations are also often less digitally 
connected than other groups. Minimal digital adoption could represent a 
significant barrier to adoption of fintech services for many underserved 
individuals.”). 
111 OCC PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 21 (positing that the main benefit of 
easing regulations on fintech companies is the increase in access to banking 
services for members of the American population who currently do not have 
access to them). 
112 McHenry et al., supra note 110, at 4 (“Unfortunately, the most recent 2015 
supplement on Internet and computer use by the US Department of 
Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
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It examined data from the 2015 FDIC Unbanked and Underbanked 
survey and the 2015 U.S. National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion Administration survey,113 and found that 45% of unbanked 
households used neither a personal computer nor mobile device, 
compared to 17% of underbanked and fully banked households.114 
Overall, the authors concluded: 
 
Fintech promises to bring economic inclusion . . . to 
the un(der)banked populations. Our research suggests, 
however, that these populations are also often less 
digitally connected than other groups. Minimal digital 
adoption could represent a significant barrier to adop-
tion of fintech services for many underserved indivi-
duals. Reaching these communities could require a 
combination of financial and digital literacy train-
ing.115 
 
B. Speed and Convenience Benefit  
 
The benefit of speed and convenience in the application 
process for fintech loans and in the receipt of loan proceeds was a 
frequently repeated expectation in the OCC Public Comments.116 
Available studies focus on small business loans and help document the 
existence of this benefit and also its degree—namely, the speed at 
                                                                                                                              
households did not use the Internet at home and 21 percent of households did 
not go online anywhere. Further, only 73 percent of Americans used a mobile 
Internet service.”). 
113 Id. at 6–7 (“The FDIC’s supplement to the CPS, the ‘National Survey of 
Unbanked and Underbanked,’ was first fielded in 2009, partly in response to a 
Congressional mandate, to help measure trends in banking inclusiveness. 
Similar to NTIA, the FDIC publishes reports following its biennial survey 
with key findings. These comprehensive reports provide a wealth of 
information related to the un(der)banked, including the current banking status 
of households, change in banking status, types of banking activities, income 
volatility, and reasons households were unbanked, among other things.”). 
114 Id. at 17, tbl. 3. 
115 Id. at 4. 
116 OCC PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 21 (highlighting the difference 
between service times, availability of assistance, and customer care between 
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which applications are processed and loan proceeds distributed.117 
Overall, existence of the speed/convenience benefit was evidenced by 
the 2015, 2016, and 2017 Small Business Credit Surveys conducted by 
Federal Reserve Banks.118 The surveys compare satisfaction levels 
among applicants at large banks, small banks, and online lenders.119 In 
the 2017 survey, 28% of applicants were dissatisfied with a difficult 
application process at large banks, compared with 24% at small banks, 
and 10% at online lenders.120 In addition, 33% of applicants were 
dissatisfied with a long wait for a credit decision or funding at large 
banks, compared to 25% at small banks and 10% at online lenders.121  
The 2016 Small Business Credit Survey asked for applicants’ 
primary reasons for dissatisfaction with particular lenders.122 In 
response to this question, 44% of applicants at large banks cited the 
difficult application process as the primary reason for their dissatis-
faction, compared to 42% of applicants at small banks and 26% of 
applicants at online lenders.123 The contrast between large banks and 
online lenders widened when applicants were asked about long waits 
for credit decisions.124 For this factor, 44% of applicants at large banks 
cited a long wait for a credit decision as the primary reason for 
dissatisfaction, compared with 45% at small banks, and 17% at online 
                                                            
117 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94 (emphasizing that 
bank applicants answered that they were most dissatisfied with long wait 
times for credit decisions or funding decisions); 2016 SMALL BUSINESS 
CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83; FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ET AL., 
2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY: REPORT ON EMPLOYER FORMS 
(2016), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/smallbusiness/2015/Report-
SBCS-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9D5-7SRX] [hereinafter 2015 SMALL 
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY] (featuring responses from 3,459 employer firms). 
118 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94; 2016 SMALL 
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83; 2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT 
SURVEY, supra note 117. 
119 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94; 2016 SMALL 
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83; 2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT 
SURVEY, supra note 117. 
120 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94.  
121 Id. (demonstrating survey results indicating the percentage of borrowers 
dissatisfied with long wait times). 








2018-2019 FINTECH LENDING 747 
 
lenders.125 The 2015 Small Business Credit Survey also asked 
successful applicants the reason(s) for any dissatisfaction.126 Similar to 
the 2016 Small Business Credit Survey, a difficult application process 
was cited as a reason for dissatisfaction by 51% of applicants at large 
banks, 52% at small banks, and 21% at online lenders.127 A long wait 
for a credit decision was cited as a reason for dissatisfaction by 45% of 
applicants at large banks, 43% of applicants at small banks, and 22% 
of applicants at online lenders.128 The evidence from the preceding 
studies confirms the existence of the expectation of convenience in the 
application process and greater speed for credit decisions from fintech 
lenders.129 It also indicates, however, that convenience and speed are 
not characteristic of all fintech lenders.130 
Jagtiani & Lemieux also studied experiences with small busi-
ness loans.131 They examined the application and funding timelines 
reported on the websites of Fintech lenders.132 Application times 
advertised varied from “minutes” to “less than 10 minutes.”133 Funding 
times varied from “minutes,” to “as little as 2 business days,” to 
“fewer than 10 business days.”134 This data is not as useful as that in 
the small business credit surveys. It documents advertised business 
practices as opposed to actual outcomes, and makes no comparison to 
application or funding timelines for small business loans at traditional 
lenders.135 It does however document fintech lender targets for the 
services they are providing.136 
                                                            
125 Id. 
126 2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 117, at 14. 
127 Id. 
128 Id.  
129 See id.; 2016 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83, at 17; 2015 
SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 117, at 14. 
130 See generally 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94; 2016 
SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83; 2015 SMALL BUSINESS 
CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 117. 
131 Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 76, at 4–16 (examining small business 
loans from nonbank institutions). 
132 Id. at 21–22 tbl. 2.  
133 Id. 
134 Id. 







748 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW VOL. 38 
 
Researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York studied 
experiences with respect to mortgage loans.137 They used loan level 
data “on the near-universe of U.S. mortgages from 2010 to 2016.”138 
They found fintech lenders reduced “processing time by 10 days, or 
20% of the average processing time.”139 The effect was larger for 
refinance mortgages (14.6 days), and smaller for purchase mortgages 
(9.2 days).140 
 Overall, in both the small business loan market and the mort-
gage market, researchers have documented improved experiences in 
speed of processing and/or funding of loan applications on the part of 
fintech lenders. 
 
C. Lower Cost Benefit/Predatory Lending Risk 
 
 The OCC Public Comments based their expectation of lower 
costs on the pass through of lower transaction costs by fintech 
lenders.141 By contrast, the expected risk of predatory lending was, in 
part, based on risk adjusted rates—a consequence of reaching borrow-
ers that would not qualify for credit from traditional lenders.142 How-
ever, it was also based on negative effects of behavioral decision 
making. These negative effects include borrower acceptance of higher 
rates due to concerns about limited access to credit, hidden charges 
and fees, and lenders encouraging renewal of loans.143  
 This article separates studies that focus on differentials in rates 
and fees (i.e., if fintech lenders provide lower cost of funds for 
borrowers) and studies that address issues of predatory lending. 
  
1. Lower Cost Benefit 
 
 Past studies focusing on differentials in rates and fees reached 
varying conclusions. Some studies found fintech lenders charged 
lower interest rates to borrowers. Jagtiani & Lemieux compared loan 
                                                            
137 See Fuster et al., supra note 4, at 1 (studying “the effects of FinTech 
lending on the U.S. mortgage market”). 
138 Id. at 2. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 1. 
141 See generally OCC PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 21 (showcasing the 
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level data on consumer loans made by LendingClub from 2007–2017 
with credit card loan data reported to the Federal Reserve by bank 
holding companies with at least $50 billion in assets.144 They 
concluded that “given the same credit risk (i.e., for borrowers with the 
same expected delinquency rate), consumers would be able to obtain 
credit at a lower rate through LendingClub than through traditional 
credit card loans offered by banks.”145 In their study, lower transaction 
costs were not identified as a source of the lower rates.146 Interestingly, 
the study identified the source of cost savings as the use of alternative 
data, allowing some borrowers, who would be classified as subprime 
using traditional lending criteria, to achieve “‘better’ loan grades and 
therefore obtain lower-priced credit. [Moreover], it does not appear 
that this credit is ‘mispriced’ in terms of default risk . . . .”147 
 Wolfe and Yoo compared consumer loans made by banks 
from 2009–2015 with loans made by Prosper Marketplace and 
LendingClub.148 They estimated that “the average bank issues loans at 
rates approximately 164 BPs [basis points] higher that the peer-to-peer 
platform Prosper after accounting for origination fees.”149 
 Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, & Seru studied mortgage loans 
originated by traditional banks, non-fintech shadow banks, and fintech 
lenders in the period between 2000–2015.150 In contrast to the findings 
reported by Wolfe and Yoo above, they found that “[f]intech firms 
charge 13 basis points more than traditional banks to observably 
similar borrows in the same zip code and quarter.”151 Furthermore, the 
                                                            
144 Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 87, at 5 (“We compare account-level credit 
card data that large banks submitted to the Federal Reserve for stress testing 
with online consumer loans that were made for credit card payoff (and debt 
consolidation) purposes. These data will allow us to investigate the determi-
nants for risk pricing used by LendingClub and the performance of these loans 
over time as well as serving to compare these loans with similar loans made 
by traditional banks.”). 
145 Id. at 12. The study did not include origination fees in its calculations. 
146 Id.  
147 Id. at 12. 
148 Brian Wolfe & Woongsun Yoo, Crowding Out Banks: Credit Substitution 
by Peer-to-Peer Lending 11, 12, 14 (Univ. of Buffalo Sch. of Mgmt., 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000593 (examining the 
FDIC Summary of Deposits database and the Call Reports filed by banking 
institutions). 
149 Id. at 35. 
150 Buchak et al., supra note 104, at 2–4. 
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difference between fintech and non-fintech shadow banks “is even 
larger at 14-16 basis points.”152 The authors note “that this premium is 
unlikely to be explained by differences in origination fees between 
fintech and non-fintech lenders.”153 The reason for this difference is 
not known, but the researchers posit that borrowers might pay a 
premium for convenience, high income borrowers attracted to fintech 
are less price elastic, or fintech lenders may be able to use big data to 
better price discriminate.154 
 In a similar vein, surveys of small business owners consis-
tently note dissatisfaction with interest rates charged by fintech lenders 
and far less dissatisfaction with interest rates charged by traditional 
bank lenders. The 2015 Small Business Credit Survey conducted by 
various Federal Reserve banks asked successful applicants their rea-
son(s) for dissatisfaction with various lenders in the small business 
loan process.155 Of the successful applicants, 70% reported high inter-
est rate as a reason for dissatisfaction with online lenders, compared to 
18% of successful applicants at large banks and 15% of successful 
applicants at small banks.156 
 The 2016 Small Business Credit Survey conducted by the 
Federal Reserve banks asked successful applicants for their primary 
reason for dissatisfaction with the small business loan process.157 High 
interest rate was cited as the primary reason for dissatisfaction by 33% 
of applicants to online lenders, compared to 6% of applicants to large 
banks, and 3% of applicants to small banks.158 
 The 2017 Small Business Credit Survey conducted by the 
Federal Reserve banks asked loan applicants what they were most 
dissatisfied with in the small business loan process,159 and found that 
online lender applicants were most dissatisfied with high interest 
rates.160 In the survey, 52% of online lender applicants were most 
dissatisfied with high interest rates, compared to 20% of applicants at 
                                                            
152 Id. at 18–19. The authors note this premium is unlikely to be explained by 
differences in origination fees. 
153 Id. at 19 n.21. 
154 Id. at 28. 
155 2015 Small Business Credit Survey, supra note 117, at 14. 
156 2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 116, at 14 (reporting 
results of specific survey questions).  
157 2016 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83, at 17. 
158 Id. at 17. 
159 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94, at 14 (reporting 
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large banks and 12% of applicants at large banks and 12% of 
applicants at small banks.161 
 The results of these various studies might be harmonized by 
noting that several studies of online lenders have found interest rates 
and fees vary. It is possible that the studies that used loans made by 
Lending Club and Prosper as the basis for their analysis chose two 
lenders that have shared cost savings with borrowers, while some or 
many other online lenders have not shared cost savings. 
 Reported interest rates by fintech lenders vary widely. As 
Jagtiani and Lemieux found:  
 
Interest rates can be competitive with traditional 
banks, but [nonbank alternative lenders] do report the 
potential for much higher loan rates. For example, 
Lending Club reports annualized percentage rates 
(APR) of 6 percent to 36 percent for consumer loans 
and 8 percent to 32 percent for business loans. 
OnDeck Capital reports APR ranging from 14 percent 
to 36 percent on their line of credit.162 
 
OnDeck Capital also reports APRs ranging from 7.3% to 98.4% on 
small business term loans.163 
 The New York State Department of Financial Services 
surveyed online lenders operating within the State for years 2015–
2017,164 and received responses from thirty-five lenders. As for the 
loans most commonly offered in 2017, respondents reported their 
APRs reported a median APR of 15.7% and average APR of 14.8% on 
loans to individuals for personal, investment or family purposes, but 
these varied from 4.3% to 25%.165 For loans to individuals for business 
or commercial purposes the median APR was 16.3%, and average 
APR was 22.2%, but these varied from 10.0% to 62.3%.166 For loans 
to businesses, the median APR was 18.5%, and the average APR was 
25.9%, but the rates varied from 8.2% to 61.8%.167 The Department 
noted that “[a]dditional information is required to evaluate what 
                                                            
161 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 93, at 14. 
162 Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 76, at 14.  
163 Id. at 22. 
164 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., ONLINE LENDING REPORT 1 (2018). 
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proportion of high APRs are driven by risk or by a high demand on the 
part of consumers or sole proprietors and small businesses . . . .”168 
 
2. Predatory Lending Risk 
 
Very high interest rates charged by some online lenders for 
some consumer or small business loans raised the distinct risk of 
predatory lending, and predatory lending was the most frequent risk 
commenters expressed in the OCC Public Comments.169 Commenters 
voiced various aspects of this risk: very high interest rates, encour-
aging constant renewal and double charging fees, unaffordable terms 
of repayment, and hidden or deceptive prepayment charges or an ina-
bility to prepay or without penalty.170 Opportunity Fund examined 
small business loans received by 104 businesses representing a 
“diverse swath of the California economy.”171 The study analyzed 150 
loans from fifty-four different lenders, all of which were online and 
alternative lenders.172 The study found the mean APR on these loans 
was 93.9%, and the median APR was 72%.173 It observed that “APR 
varied widely and inconsistently by borrower and business characteris-
tics . . . . [T]he rate charged should decline as signs of potential risk 
decrease, but such a pattern is not evident in the data set.”174 
 The Opportunity Fund report also examined whether terms of 
repayment were affordable.175 It looked to business net income to 
evaluate Cash Flow Available for Debt Service (CFADS).176 It found 
that “nearly half (47%) of borrowers in the Opportunity Fund data set 
                                                            
168 Id. 
169 See generally OCC PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 21. 
170 See generally id. 
171 Opportunity Fund is the nation’s largest nonprofit micro lender. See ERIC 
WEAVER ET AL., OPPORTUNITY FUND, UNAFFORDABLE AND UNSUSTAINABLE: 






173 Id. at 6 (observing that that “the alternative lending market subjects small 
businesses to charges that many might consider usurious . . . .”). 
174 Id. at 6. 
175 Id. (suggesting that many alternative lenders induce otherwise credit-
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were devoting more than 100% of their monthly take-home pay to debt 
repayment . . . .”177 On average, the portion of a small business 
owner’s monthly net income devoted to payments to alternative 
lenders was almost 178%.178 It found average monthly payments 
varied widely by borrower and business characteristics, and among 
Hispanic borrowers in the sample, the average monthly loan payment 
was more than 400% of net income.179 However, the authors noted that 
“not all alternative small-business lenders were offering” unsustainable 
loan products;180 for example, some offered “sustainable loans of one 
year or longer and APRs not exceeding 30%.”181 A distinct relevant 
study conducted by Fuster et al. (discussed above),182 which examined 
mortgage loans, does not compare interest rates on loans, but found 
“little evidence the FinTech lenders disproportionately target marginal 
borrowers with low access to finance.”183 Targeting vulnerable groups 
is often viewed as a characteristic of predatory lending.184 
 
D. Fair Lending Risk/Benefit 
 
 The OCC Public Comments contain a divide in expectations 
concerning possible fair lending violations.185 Some comments 
expected automated, data driven underwriting would decrease the risk 
of bias in lending decisions,186 while others feared that bias would be 
embedded in the data or algorithms used by fintech lenders.187 
                                                            
177 Id. at 7. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. (“It should be noted again that not all alternative small-business lenders 
are offering toxic products.”). 
181 Id. 
182 See Fuster et al., supra note 4, at 1.  
183 Id. at 4. 
184 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The 
Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260 
(2002). 
185 Compare WEAVER ET AL., supra note 171 (observing that small loans 
frequently leave their borrowers in cycles of crushing debt), with Fuster, supra 
note 4 (finding little evidence that FinTech lending disproportionately targets 
minority borrowers). 
186 Letter from Peter Renton, supra note 25 (“New data sources and the 
application of artificial intelligence to the underwriting process means that 
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 There are few studies available concerning the risk/benefit of 
fintech lending with respect to fair lending violations. Bartlett, Morse, 
Stanton & Wallace studied the level of ethnic discrimination among 
conventional and fintech lenders in the mortgage market.188 They 
examined loan applications and approved loans sourced to government 
sponsored entities (i.e., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) between 2007–
2012.189 They analyzed information at the loan level on income, 
ethnicity, debt-to-income ratios, loan-to-value ratios, contract terms, 
and indicators for whether the lender used algorithmic underwriting.190 
They concluded the following: “[a]fter controlling for observable 
differences, we find that African-American and Hispanic borrowers 
are almost 5% more likely to be rejected for a mortgage [by traditional 
lenders] than other borrowers. . . .”191 By contrast, “[f]intech lenders 
are nearly 1% (92 basis points) less likely to reject an African-
American or Hispanic loan applicant for reasons unrelated to obser-
vable life-cycle covariates.”192 In addition, with respect to pricing of 
loans, after controlling for observable differences, they found African-
American and Hispanic borrowers “pay [traditional lenders] a slightly 
(0.08%) higher interest rate for purchase mortgages and about 0.03% 
higher mortgage interest rate for refinance mortgages.”193 They note, 
however, that “[t]hese differences are less pronounced among refi 
lenders who utilize algorithmic underwriting, for whom the differential 
                                                                                                                              
Askins, supra note 26, at 2–3 (stating that “objective lending technology 
reduces the perceived bias in funding loans). 
187 Letter from John Taylor, supra note 52, at 9 (“They have developed 
unorthodox underwriting approaches using automation and algorithms that are 
often opaque. These algorithms pose possible disparate impacts if they 
implement seemingly objective criteria that nevertheless result in dispropor-
tionately rejecting applications of credit for minorities, women, or other 
protected classes.”). 
188 See generally Robert P. Bartlett et al., Consumer Lending Discrimination 
in the FinTech Era (UC Berkley Pub. L. Res. Paper, 2017), https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=3063448. (examining Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data 
provided by Dataquick, McDash, and Equifax). 
189 Id. at 3. 
190 Id. at 1. 
191 Id. at 24; see also id. at 18 (detailing the unexplained discriminatory rates 
of large and small fintechs).] 
192 Id. at 18. 
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is only 0.01%.”194 In other words, fintech lending decreases the risk of 
fair lending violations, both for loan approval and fair pricing. 
 
E. Loan Portfolio Performance: Default and 
Delinquency Benefit/Risk 
 
 Expectations concerning risks of default pertaining to loans 
underwritten by fintech lenders was largely voiced as a word of 
caution; i.e., they related to the uncertainty regarding loan performance 
for loans underwritten based on new models (and particularly in the 
event of an economic downturn).195 While such a downturn has not yet 
occurred, the current market, fintech lenders have experienced lower 
default rates than traditional lenders.196 
 Fuster, Plosser, Vickery & Schnabe examined fintech lenders 
in the mortgage market.197 They examined U.S. mortgages originated 
from 2010 to 2016, and studied default rates on FHA loans, and found 
that “loans originated by FinTech lenders are 35% less likely to default 
than comparable loans originated by non-FinTech lenders.”198 Balyuk 
examined default rates in consumer loans.199 She examined data on 
loans made by Prosper Marketplace, one of the largest peer-to-peer 
lenders in the United States, in the period between 2011 and 2015.200 
She found total debt of borrowers who receive peer-to-peer loans was 
3.6% higher than those whose loans were rejected.201 However, the 
                                                            
194 Id. (“These differences are less pronounced among refi lenders who utilize 
algorithmic underwriting, for whom the differential is only 0.01%.”). 
195 See Fuster et al., supra note 4, at 1–2. 
196 Id. at 2–3 (“We find that default rates on FinTech mortgages are about 
25% lower than those for traditional lenders, even when controlling for 
detailed loan characteristics.”). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 16 (“[W]e find that loans originated by FinTech lenders are 35% less 
likely to default than comparable loans originated by non-FinTech lenders.”). 
Default rates were calculated based on loans that were at least ninety days 
delinquent or were subject to an FHA insurance claim. The results were the 
same for a one-year and two-year default rate, and “quantitatively similar . . . 
when considering home purchase loans or refinances separately,” as well as 
for loans to underserved communities. Id. 
199 Tetyana Balyuk, Financial Innovation and Borrowers: Evidence from 
Peer-to-Peer Lending (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper No. 2802220, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802220. 
200 See generally id. 
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higher total debt does not lead to higher delinquency rates.202 This 
result is consistent with a study by TransUnion Credit Bureau of over 
forty million personal loans that originated between 2014 and 2016.203 
The study found that fintech lenders have delinquency rates higher 
than other lenders in the subprime risk tier;204 this tier accounts for ten 
percent of fintech balances.205 It noted that “looking at the near prime 
risk tier, FinTech delinquencies drop below traditional lender delin-
quencies. For prime risk tiers, delinquency rates for all lenders begin to 
converge,” and, moving up the credit spectrum, become “almost indis-
tinguishable.”206 
 In the economic climate of recent years, the underwriting 
model used by fintech lenders has not resulted in higher default/ 
delinquency in loans.207 Indeed, in the consumer loan and mortgage 
markets, rates of delinquency are lower for fintech lenders.208 How-
ever, this still leaves open the question of how these loans will fare in 
the event of an economic downturn or recession. 
 
F. Lack of Transparency Risk 
 
 The expected risk of lack of transparency was a concern in 
OCC Public Comments both for the borrower and the investors 
funding fintech lending.209 Studies of transparency to date have largely 
focused only on the small business borrower.210 Are terms and rates 
clearly disclosed to applicants and borrowers? Two studies of market 
practices both signal there may be some cause for concern, although 
concern also exists with respect to transparency at large banking 
institutions.211 
                                                            
202 Id. 





208 See Balyuk, supra note 199, at 38; Fuster et al., supra note 4, at 2–3. 
209 See OCC Public Comments, supra note 21. 
210 See e.g., 2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 117. 
211 See 2016 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83; 2015 SMALL 
BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 117 (highlighting that the “31% of 
firms [that were] dissatisfied with their experience pointed to a lack of 
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 The 2015 Small Business Credit Survey collected information 
from businesses in twenty-six states.212 Part of the survey involved 
satisfaction with the application process,213 and respondents reported 
nearly equal levels of dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency at 
both large banks and online lenders.214 Lack of transparency was a 
reason for dissatisfaction among 33% of successful applicants at large 
banks, 32% at online lenders, and 22% at small banks.215 
 The survey was repeated in 2016 with information collected 
from small businesses in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.216 
Respondents reported similar results with respect to applicants’ 
dissatisfaction due to lack of transparency.217 Forty-nine percent of 
applicants cited lack of transparency as their primary reason for 
dissatisfaction with online lenders, compared to 48% with large banks, 
and 47% with small banks.218 
 The survey was repeated again in 2017 with information from 
small businesses in the fifty states and the District of Columbia.219 This 
survey yielded similar results, although the overall frequency of dis-
satisfaction due to lack of transparency in the application process 
declined.220 Specifically, the survey found 15% of applicants dissatis-
fied with online lenders for lack of transparency, compared with 14% 
at large banks, and 9% at small banks.221  
Each survey was slightly different, both in terms of number 
and distribution of respondents and in terms of method of reporting.222 
The 2015 survey reported dissatisfaction among successful appli-
                                                            
212 2015 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 117, at iii.  
213 Id. at 14. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 14. 
216 2016 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 83, at iii. 
217 Id. at 17. 
218 Id. at 17. 
219 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94, at iii.  
220 Id. at 14. 
221 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 94, at 14 (showing that 
“borrower satisfaction is consistently highest with CDFIs, credit unions, and 
small banks, but satisfaction with online lenders has increased.”). 
222 Compare 2015 Small Business Credit Survey, supra note 117 at 14 
(finding that successful applicants were not satisfied), and 2016 Small 
Business Credit Survey, supra note 83, at 14 (focusing on the reason for 
applicants’ lack of satisfaction with their primary lender), with 2017 Small 
Business Credit Survey, supra note 94, at 18 (including responses from 
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cants.223 The 2016 survey reported dissatisfaction among all applicants 
and also focused on the primary reason for dissatisfaction with the 
particular lender.224 The 2017 survey also included responses from all 
applicants but it did not target the primary reason for dissatisfaction 
with the particular applicant.225 Thus, the most useful information lies 
in the comparison of lenders in each survey. Small businesses reported 
they are equally dissatisfied with lack of transparency at both online 
lenders and large banks.226 Further research is required to examine 
market outcomes with respect to the expected benefit or risk to custo-
mer privacy and data security, or the expected risk of lack of sufficient 
transparency for investors. 
 
III. Policy Implications and Conclusion 
 The overriding issue when considering regulatory or legisla-
tive intervention is whether market choices can be relied upon to 
deliver the benefits of fintech lending and to address its risks. This is 
especially important in the fintech industry that has introduced many 
innovations in a lightly regulated environment. 
In OCC Public Comments the expected benefit of fintech 
lending most frequently recited was increased access to credit.227 It 
was an expected benefit identified in the Treasury Department and 
GAO surveys as well.228 Overall, market outcomes largely confirm 
delivery of this benefit in the consumer loan market and small business 
market.229 Increased access was provided through removal of geo-
graphic barriers to credit and through availability of smaller loans.230 It 
was also available through increased access for younger firms, smaller 
firms, and minority-owned firms.231 However, the evidence is divided 
as to whether consumers with credit challenges under traditional 
criteria for creditworthiness experienced increased access to credit in 
                                                            
223 See 2015 Small Business Credit Survey, supra note 117, at 14. 
224 See 2016 Small Business Credit Survey, supra note 83, at 17. 
225 See 2017 Small Business Credit Survey, supra note 94, at 18. 
226 2017 Small Business Credit Survey, supra note 94, at 18; 2016 Small 
Business Credit Survey, supra note 83, at 14; 2015 Small Business Credit 
Survey, supra note 117, at 14. 
227 See, e.g., Letter from Stephen Denis, supra note 24. 
228 See GAO-17-361, supra note 6, at 19. 
229 See, e.g., Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 76 at 11–13. 
230 See id. at 13–15. 
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either the consumer loan market or mortgage market.232 Moreover, it is 
unlikely that fintech lending has increased access to credit among the 
unbanked.233  
Market outcomes also confirm the expected benefits of faster 
and more convenient access to credit.234 However, the evidence is 
divided on the expected benefit of lower costs to borrowers.235 Market 
outcomes evidence high interest rates in some markets, and even 
usurious or predatory terms in some cases.236 In other words, market 
risk, rather than market benefit, was actually in evidence. 
Market outcomes also confirmed the expected risk of lack of 
transparency in loan terms and pricing in the small business loan mar-
ket.237 However, two expected risks have not surfaced. One is a 
heightened risk of default due to nontraditional methods of credit 
assessment.238 The other is the risk of fair lending violations.239 Indeed, 
the evidence suggests that automated credit underwriting procedure 
performed by fintech firms has decreased the risk of biased out-
comes.240 Those outcomes signal a need to embrace regulatory or 
legislative initiatives that control excessive interest rates and fees, 
which in turn require transparency, especially in the small business 
loan market.241 Nonetheless, the outcomes to date generally do not 
require greater financial inclusion on the part of fintech lenders, 
except, perhaps, in the mortgage loan market and technological liter-
acy initiatives for the unbanked.242 The outcomes to date also do not 
signal a need to address the risk of loan defaults through substantial 
                                                            
232 See McHenry et al., supra note 110, at 4. 
233 Id. 
234 See generally Letter from Stephen Denis, supra note 24; Letter from 
Daniel Gorfine, supra note 24; Letter from Robert S. Lavet, supra note 24. 
235 See, e.g., Letter from Richarld H. Neiman, supra note 27 (explaining that 
small businesses seeking smaller loans usually find it hard to access 
traditional loan markets). 
236 See, e.g., Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 43 (presenting 
an example of 333% interest rate imposed by lender, and charges of 
misleading consumers and imposing unlawful fees); Letter from Responsible 
Bus. Lending Coal., supra note 27; Letter from Kevin Stein, supra note 43. 
237 Letter from Richard H. Neiman, supra note 27. 
238 Wirth, supra note 97. 
239 Letter from Chester, Kopp & Mierzwinski, supra note 47. 
240 Id. See also Letter from Gregory W. Meeks, Cedric L. Richmond, Gwen 
Moore, Terri A. Sewell, Donald M. Payne, & Tony Cardenas, supra note 48. 
241 Letter from Brian Simmonds Marshall, supra note 54. 
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capital requirements.243 The caveat is that fintech lenders’ under-
writing procedure has not been tested in an economic downturn.  
 On July 31, 2018 the OCC announced it will begin to accept 
applications for SPNB Charters for Fintech Companies.244 This fol-
lowed the Department of the Treasury’s endorsement of such a char-
ter.245 What regulatory requirements should such a charter impose to 
address risks and benefits of fintech lending identified in this article? 
The Licensing Manual for charter applications from fintech com-
panies, issued July 31, 2018, makes no mention of transparency 
requirements,246 nor does the OCC Policy Statement on Financial 
Technology Companies.247 This is understandable in that the risk of 
lack of transparency for borrowers is a risk identified in the small 
business loan market.248 The Truth-in-Lending Act requires transpar-
ency in consumer loans, but its reach does not extend to small business 
loans.249 This is a matter, therefore, that the Comptroller cannot 
address by regulation, but requires legislative action. 
                                                            
243 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S 
LICENSING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS 
FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (July 2018), https://www.occ. 
treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/pub-
considering-charter-apps-from-fin-tech-co.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L55-N6JY] 
[hereinafter Licensing Manual Supplement] (stating that the capital 
requirement only sets a floor and may not be sufficient for measuring capital 
adequacy for some SPNBs). 
244 Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, NR 2018-74, 
OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications from Financial 
Technology Companies (July 31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html [https://perma.cc/C32X-
Ys92]. 
245 Nonbank Financials, supra note 3, at 10 (“At the federal level, Treasury 
encourages the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to further develop 
its special purpose national bank charter. . . .”).  
246 Licensing Manual Supplement, supra note 243. 
247 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Policy Statement on Financial 
Technology Companies’ Eligibility to Apply for National Bank Charters (Jul. 
31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-
publications-reports/pub-other-occ-policy-statement-fintech.pdf 
[https://perman.cc/ARV2-2J46] [hereinafter Policy Statement on Eligibility] 
(omitting any transparency requirement for fintech’s eligibility to apply for a 
national bank charter). 
248 See supra notes 213–21 and accompanying text. 
249 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601(a), 1603(1) (2012) (outlining the focus of the TILA on 
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 The benefit of increased access to credit and the risk of 
excessive or predatory rates and fees are briefly mentioned in the 
Comptroller’s newly issued Policy Statement and Licensing Manual 
Supplement.250 The Policy Statement addresses access in its discussion 
of financial inclusion, in these terms:  
 
The OCC . . . expects a fintech company that receives 
a national bank charter to demonstrate a commitment 
to financial inclusion. The nature of that commitment 
will depend on the company’s business model and the 
types of products, services, and activities it plans to 
provide. By providing a high standard similar to the 
Community Reinvestment Act’s expectations for 
national banks that take insured deposits, the financial 
inclusion commitment will help ensure that all 
national banks provide fair access to financial servi-
ces and treat customers fairly.251 
 
The market outcomes discussed in Part II of this article 
indicate market forces are already generating many forms of increased 
access to credit in the consumer personal loan market and the small 
business loan market. The mortgage market, however, has not clearly 
realized this benefit. Moreover, the evidence is divided as to whether 
credit-challenged borrowers under traditional underwriting criteria 
experience greater access in the fintech loan market. Some of the OCC 
Public Comments raised questions concerning the OCC’s power to 
impose a financial inclusion requirement for licensing252 That issue is 
beyond the scope of this article. However, financial inclusion obliga-
tions in the mortgage market do arise from the Community Reinvest-
                                                                                                                              
TILA is not applicable to extensions of credit primarily for business, 
commercial or agricultural purposes). 
250 Licensing Manual Supplement, supra note 243, at 18 (describing how, 
prior to approval, the OCC will review the extent to which the SPNB will help 
meet the credit needs of underserved populations); Policy Statement on 
Eligibility, supra note 247, at 4. 
251 Policy Statement on Eligibility, supra note 247, at 3. See also Licensing 
Manual Supplement, supra note 243, at 17–18. 
252 Brian R. Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 
20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 191 (2017). (arguing for further regulation 
in relation to expanding or modifying the Community Reinvestment Act). See 
generally OCC Public Comments, supra note 21 (describing the public’s 
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ment Act.253 That statute applies to “regulated financial institutions”, 
defined as “an insured depository institution (as defined in section 
1813 of this title . . .”254 The Act does not apply to financial institutions 
that do not receive insured deposits, and therefore does not apply to 
current fintech lenders absent legislative action.255  
 Finally, with regard to the risk of excessive rates, fees, and 
other predatory lending issues, the OCC’s Policy Statement merely 
mentions that in providing a charter the OCC “will consider whether a 
proposed [fintech] bank . . . will provide fair access to financial 
services, will treat customers fairly, and will comply with the applic-
able laws and regulations.”256 However, it also warns that “proposals 
that include financial products and services that have predatory, unfair, 
or deceptive features or that pose undue risk to consumer protection, 
would be inconsistent with law and policy and would not be 
approved.”257 
Some of the OCC Public Comments pointed out that a 
national charter might exacerbate the risk of excessive interest rates 
and predatory lending by preempting state laws.258 The scope of 
federal preemption of state law is beyond the reach of this article. 
However, in light of the evidence of excessive rates and predatory 
                                                            
253 See generally Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 
(2012). 
254 See id. §§ 2901(a)(1)–2902(2). 
255 Id. 
256 Policy Statement on Eligibility, supra note 247, at 1. 
257 Id. at 3–4. 
258 Letter from Thomas J. Miller, Attorney Gen. of Iowa, to Thomas J. Curry, 
Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017) (explaining that because fintech 
companies with national charters may not be subject to state consumer 
protection laws, such charters may make predatory lending practices more 
rampant); Letter from Maria T. Vullo, Superintendent, N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Fin. Servs. to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017) 
(“A national fintech charter . . . would harm . . . the rights of consumers to 
financial choice and protection from predatory practices.”); Letter from Robin 
L. Wiessman, Pa. Dep’t of Banking and Sec. to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller 
of the Currency (Jan. 17, 2017) (discussing risks that may arise due to the 
preemption of state consumer protection laws provided to fintech companies 
through the national charter). See generally OCC Public Comments, supra 
note 21 (listing various public letters written to OCC providing opinions and 
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terms found in Part II of this article, the possible heightened risk of 
predatory lending is an issue that requires close scrutiny.259 
The issue of risk management and capital requirements is 
addressed in the OCC Licensing Manual Supplement for fintech 
companies.260 After stating fintech banks with a national charter will 
be subject to the minimum leverage and risk-based capital require-
ments that apply to all national banks, the Licensing Manual highlights 
risks posed by nontraditional strategies.261 The OCC then states that 
“organizers should propose minimum capital levels the bank will 
adhere to after profitability that would be appropriate for” the risks 
associated with the applicant’s business plan, including “volatility 
specific to a business line.”262 The market outcomes to date on default 
and delinquency suggest a low level of risk from fintech lending, 
indicating that there is no need for significantly greater capital require-
ments.263 However, there are two words of caution in embracing this 
conclusion. First, fintech lenders’ nontraditional underwriting practices 
have created loans that have not faced an economic downturn.264 
Second, the Opportunity Fund’s study highlights that some fintech 
lenders are making loans with terms that are not sustainable .265 
                                                            
259
 WEAVER ET AL., supra note 171, at 9 (“Alternative small-business lending 
is a rapidly developing market sector, often operating outside the purview of 
regulations designed both to provide market clarity and to protect consumers 
from predatory and insupportable practices.”). 
260 Licensing Manual Supplement, supra note 243, at 7, 15. 
261 Id. at 9. 
262 Id. at 9 (“[O]rganizers should propose minimum capital levels the bank 
will adhere to after profitability that would be appropriate for its ongoing 
operations. Organizers also should discuss how the bank would address 
adverse market conditions that could deplete capital, such as broad market 
volatility or volatility specific to a business line.”). 
263 Fuster, et al., supra note 4, at 18 (“Our analysis of default rates finds no 
evidence that FinTech (sic) lenders originate riskier mortgages --- in fact, in 
the FHA market we find the opposite result.”). 
264 Claessens et al., supra note 70, at 40 (“[T]he resilience of new fintech 
credit processes and firms has not yet been tested over a full economic and 
credit cycle. [I]t is not clear how fintech credit will perform when conditions 
deteriorate.”). 
265 See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text (discussing whether new 
fintech lending options are ultimately sustainable). See also WEAVER ET AL., 
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Seeking an SPNB charter is merely an option for a fintech 
lender.266 If fintech lenders chose not to obtain such a charter, the risks 
identified in this article must be addressed under other, existing federal 
or state laws and regulatory requirements. Whether such laws and 
requirements are up to the task of minimizing the risks of predatory 
lending and potential default risks while maximizing the benefit of 
increased access to credit, are issues to be explored as fintech lending 
quickly emerges. 
 
                                                            
266 Press Release, supra note 244, at 2 (“A national bank charter is only one 
option among many for companies engaged in the business of banking.”). 
